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The financial  crisis that hit the East Asian countries  in 1997  revealed substantial  vulnerabilities
in the financial sector. It turned out that most financial institutions  had a large amount  of non-
performing  loans, which were the result of poor risk management  and excessive  lending  to some
parts of the real sector. In fact, a large number of financial institutions were insolvent  and
subsequently  had to be either financially  supported,  merged  or liquidated.  Poor risk management
was  caused by  weak  corporate governance and  limited investment in  risk  management
technology. Excessive lending was caused to a large extent by extensive cross-ownership  of
banks and  companies, weak enforcement of banking regulations and  government-directed
lending. Some banks withstood the crises better than others. This raises the question whether
some segments  of the East Asian  banking  sectors  performed  better than others.
Typical comparisons of  bank performance use either simple aggregate bank ratios
relating  cost to revenues  or assets, or the more  sophisticated  frontier  technique  which measures  a
bank's efficiency by its distance to the efficient frontier. In this paper we will use a  non-
stochastic frontier technique called Data Envelopment Analysis to  explain differences in
efficiency across East Asian banks during the pre-crisis  period 1992-96.  We will focus our
analysis on five countries - Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  the Philippines,  and Thailand, since
those countries were most affected by the financial crisis and were characterised by similar
vulnerabilities in their financial sectors, namely excessive borrowing, weak regulatory and
supervisory  frameworks,  concentrated  bank ownership  and family control  of banks.  We postulate
that efficiency  measures  are not sufficient  to assess the overall performance  of a bank, but that
risk factors should  be taken into account as well. We therefore introduce  a measure  of bank risk-
taking. We find that foreign-owned  banks  took little risk relative  to other banks in the East Asian
region,  and that family-owned  banks were among  the most risky banks, together  with company-
owned banks. Our risk measure has explanatory  power in terms of predicting  which banks  were
to be restructured after the crisis of 1997. Not only do we find that restructured banks had
excessive credit growth (indicating excessive risk-taking),  but we also find that restructured
banks  were mostly  family-owned  or company-owned,  and almost  never  foreign-owned.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section I gives an overview of closely related
literature and describes the most widely used methodologies  to measure  bank efficiency,  which
are Data Envelopment  Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Section 2 puts forward our
critique to using efficiency models  to measure bank performance  and introduces  a measure of
2bank risk-taking. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the East Asian financial sectors. Sections 4
and  5 describe  the  data  and  methodology that  we will use.  Section 6  presents  our empirical
findings.  Section  7  explores  the  power  of  our  measure  of risk-taking  in  predicting  actual
restructuring of banks in East Asia. Section 8 concludes.
1. Literature
The literature  distinguishes two types of bank efficiency. The first is operational efficiency as
introduced by Farrell (1957) to measure efficiency and the second is X-efficiency as introduced
by  Leibenstein  (1966)  to  explain  differences  in  efficiency  between  banks.  The  concept  of
operational  efficiency  is  a  purely  technical  and  can be  defined  as the  product  of technical
efficiency,  which  tells  us "how  far" the  bank is from the  isoquant,  and allocative  efficiency,
which  captures  inefficiencies  due  to  the  fact  that  the  bank  picked  a  sub-optimal  input
combination given  input prices.  Under X-efficiency the basic problem is viewed as one that is
intrinsic to the nature  of human organisation. X-inefficiency may arise for reasons  outside the
knowledge  or  capability  of  management,  including corporate  governance  problems  and  the
difficulties of principal-agent relationships within organisations.
There are two widely used approaches to examine a bank's  input-output process. In the
first, the so-called  production  approach, banks are treated  as firms which  employ capital and
labour to  produce  different  types of deposit  and loan  accounts. Outputs  are measured by  the
number  of deposit  and  loan  accounts  or number  of transactions  performed  on  each type  of
product,  while total costs  are the operating  costs used to produce these products.  The bank is
viewed as a producer of two types of services: an acquirer of funds and user of funds. In the
second, the so-called  intermediation approach, banks are viewed as intermediators of financial
services  rather  than  producers  of  loan  and  deposit  account  services.  Banks  produce
intermediation services through the collection of deposits and other liabilities and the transfer of
these  funds to interest-earning  assets. Deposits are included as a third  input along with capital
and labour. As a result, operating  costs, as well as interest cost, are taken  into account in the
production  process. In this  study we will use the intermediation approach. However, as Mester
(1996) points out, both approaches have the disadvantage that they do not take into account risk
factors. Also, both concepts assume that all banks produce the same output quality. It is likely,
however, that there  are unmeasured differences  in quality, because banking  data do not fully
capture the heterogeneity  in bank output. Berger and Mester (1997) try to alleviate this problem
3by controlling for the ratio of nonperforning  loans to total loans. However, this ratio is likely to
be endogenous to each bank's efficiency.
There are two  empirical ways to measure efficiency. The first  is called nonparametric
programming and was initiated by Charnes et al. (1978). The second is the so-called parametric
stochastic frontier technique as introduced by Aigner et al. (1977). The fundamental difference
between  both  techniques  is  that  in  the  second  set  of techniques  the  research  postulates  a
parametric frontier based on a behavioural maximisation hypothesis. This is usually a production,
cost or profit frontier. In all three cases, the parametric stochastic frontier technique assumes that
maximising behaviour is present and that it is exhibited by the most efficient firms in the sample.
Often there do not exist any a priori grounds for making this assumption. In that case, as Button
et al. (1992) point out, the nonparametric approach may be preferred. Another difference is that
the first set of techniques  only measures technical efficiencies as defined by Farrell (1957). The
second set of techniques  can also measure allocative efficiencies, as long as the pre-specified
frontier function takes output levels as given. The most widely used nonparametric technique is
called Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA) and  the most widely  used parametric  technique  is
called Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
DEA constructs a convex hull of the observed input-output observations for a given set
of  firms or  organisations,  under  different  assumptions  about returns  to  scale.  As  such,  this
technique constructs a frontier based  simply on the distance of the best-practice firms from the
rest. There is no  implicit assumption of maximising behaviour on the part of any of the firms,
including the best-practice finns. SFA measures technical efficiency and allocative efficiency by
the size of the error between observed cost or profit performance and the sum of the parametrised
maximum and a symmetrically distributed noise term.
DEA accounts for technical inefficiency in using too many inputs (input orientation) or
producing  too  few  outputs  (output  orientation).  There  are  two  widely  used  orientations  in
applying DEA techniques. The first, developed by Charnes et al. (1978) assumes constant returns
to scale (CRS). The second, developed by Banker et al. (1984) does not assume constant returns
to  scale  and  is called  the  Variable  Returns to  Scale  (VRS)  orientation.  The  output-oriented
measure of the efficiency of bankf  in year t,  Ey (x  ,  )can  be computed for each banlf=
1,..., F and for each period t = 1,...,  T by the following program which uses the VRS orientation:
max,  Of t =[Ey(xft  ,yft)]-l  (1)
4F  T
s.t.  93ft y  mf  Z  <  2  ,  Y  ,  m  1, ... , M,  (2)
f=1 t=l
F  T
if'xft  <Xf"  n= I1,  ..  ,N,  . (3)
f=I  t=1
Aft21 O,  fl=  I,,  F,  t=1,...,T,  (4)
F  T
,tt  1.  f=  I,-,  F,  .t=  I,T,  (5)
f=I =
where  Ym is output m, x,  is input n; and scalars are in italic, vectors are in bold, matrices are in
bold capitals. The assumption of CRS is useful if by using the VRS orientation many banks turn
out to be efficient. CRS  is identical to VRS without restriction (5). Since the scaling is radial,
any slacks remaining in the solution to the DEA envelopment problem are not incorporated into
the efficiency measures. Thus the above efficiency measure may overstate technical efficiency.
The most widely  used concepts for measuring efficiency of financial institutions using
SFA  are  cost  efficiency,  standard  profit  efficiency  and  alternative  profit  efficiency.  Cost
efficiency  gives a  measure  of how  close a bank's  cost is to what  a best-practice bank's  cost
would  be for  producing  the  same output bundle  under the  same conditions.  Profit efficiency
measures how close a bank is to producing the maximum possible profit given a particular level
of input prices and output prices. In contrast to the cost function, the profit function allows for
consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs. Alternative
profit efficiency, finally, measures how close a bank comes to earning maximum profits given its
output levels rather than its output prices.
According to Berger and Mester (1997), the profit efficiency concept is superior to the
cost efficiency concept because it accounts for errors on the output side as well as on the input
side.  The  difference  between  the  two  profit  efficiency  concepts  is  that  the  standard  profit
efficiency concept assumes that banks are price-takers in both input and output markets, while
the alternative profit efficiency concept assumes that banks are price-takers in input markets only
and can set output prices.  Since the input prices (i.e., interest rates on bank funding) of the East
Asian banks are to  a large extent  determined by the oligopolistic market structures of the five
banking systems, the assumption of all banks being price takers does not seem to be a realistic
one. At  least the  large banks  are likely to have been able to  influence their input prices. The
5assumption  of price-taking  in output  markets  seems unrealistic  as well,  because the loan  markets
in the five East  Asian countries  are not highly  competitive.
Berger and Mester (1997) derive alternative  profit efficiency from the following  pre-
specified  profit function,  in log form,
ln(Qr  + S) = f(w,  y, z, e) + In  v,  - In  u, ,  (6)
where xr  is the variable  profits of the firm,  4 is a constant  added  to every firm's profit so that the
natural log is taken of a positive number,  f denotes some functional  form, w is the vector of
prices of variable inputs, y  is the vector of quantities of variable outputs, z  indicates the
quantities  of any fixed inputs, e is a set of environmental  or market variables that may affect
efficiency, u,r denotes  an inefficiency  factor  that may lower  profits below the best-practice  level,
and  v,f  denotes the random error that incorporates measurement error and luck that may
temporarily  give  banks high or low profits. The inefficiency  factor  u, incorporates  both allocative
inefficiencies from  failing to  react  optimally to  relative prices of  inputs, and  technical
inefficiencies  from employing  too much of the inputs to produce  y or setting  sub-optimal  output
prices. As Mester (1996) points out, the profit concept  assumes  that all financial institutions  use
the same  technology.  This assumption  seems to be a strong one, because  it is likely that foreign
banks  use superior  technology  compared  to domestic  financial  institutions.
Application of both techniques on the same banking data can lead to very different
results as  Ferrier and Lovell (1990) have shown. The choice of technique depends on the
situation. Possible reasons to prefer SFA over DEA are plentiful. Firstly, as pointed out by
Schmidt  (1986), DEA estimates  give only an upper bound to efficiency  measures so that it is
difficult to  use DEA to  compare efficiency among frms.  Secondly, DEA does not assume
statistical noise which means  that all the error term in the estimation  is attributed  to inefficiency.
This means that DEA will account for the influence of factors such as regional factor price
differences, luck, bad data and extreme observations  as "inefficiency".  Therefore, as Schmidt
(1986) has pointed out, one would expect that DEA produces greater measured levels of
inefficiency  than SFA. Thirdly,  the estimates  generated  by using DEA are not very robust.  As
Button (1992) points out, measured DEA efficiency in small samples is  sensitive to  the
difference  between  the number  of firms and the sum  of inputs and outputs used. This is because
the small number  of free dimensions  remaining  increases  the chance of each firm being seen as
efficient.  Moreover,  as Greene (1993) points out, a single errant observation  can have profound
effects on estimates  of DEA frontiers.
6The major reason to  prefer DEA over SFA is that DEA can be  used even when
conventional  cost and profit functions  that depend  on optimising  reactions to prices can not be
justified. Since it is likely that regulations  and other market imperfections  distort prices in the
East Asian banking sectors complicating  the application  of SFA to price and quantity data, it
seems that DEA is more suitable for examining  the efficiency  of East Asian banks. A practical
consideration  to use DEA instead of SFA is that it avoids  having  to measure  output  prices,  which
are not available  for transactions  services  and fee-based  outputs.
Most bank efficiency  studies look at the US or other developed  countries.  Bhattacharyya
et al. (1997) have applied such techniques to Indian banks in the first study using data of a
developing  country.  The only bank efficiency  studies so far that have used East Asian banking
data are Leightner  and Lovell (1997),  Leightner  (1997), Gilbert  and Wilson  (1998) and Hao et al.
(1999).  Leightner  and Lovell (1997)  use linear programming  techniques  and Thai banking  data to
show that Thai banks experienced  high growth rates in production  during the years of 1990-94.
They argue that these high growth rates indicate an unusual level of success of the banking
system.  Leightner  (1997)  uses identical  linear programming  techniques  on data between 1990-95
for Thailand's finance and securities companies. He shows that, although the finance and
security  companies  enjoyed  tremendous  profitability  and rapid growth,  these firms were not fully
efficient, i.e. that profits could have been increased even more by changing the output and/or
input mix. He also finds strong economies of scale and argues that the finance and security
companies  are too small to compete  with the larger banks. Gilbert and Wilson (1998)  use linear
programming  techniques to  investigate the effects of privatisation and deregulation on the
productivity  of Korean banks over the years 1980-94.  They find that Korean banks responded  to
privatisation  and deregulation  by altering  their mix of inputs and outputs, yielding  large changes
in productivity.  Hao et al. (1999) use the stochastic frontier approach  to explain differences in
efficiency scores  for 19 Korean banks over the period 1985-95.  They find that banks  with faster
growth rates, banks with a countrywide  branch  network,  and banks  which made extensive  use of
deposits in funding their assets were most efficient.
2. Efficiency  and Risk-Taking
In the previous section we have already pointed out that bank efficiency models have the
disadvantage  that they do not take into account risk factors. Firstly, they assume that all banks
are risk neutral. Secondly, they ignore risk-taking  by banks. Efficiency models, for example,
7assume  that book values  of net loans equal  market values  of gross loans. In most cases, however,
there is a discrepancy  between the market and book value of loans. A particular case is when
loan data are distorted by inadequately reported nonperforming  loans. Application of such
distorted data to efficiency models might lead to incorrect conclusions,  because banks with
excessive loan growth will show high technical efficiency  (ceteris paribus), while they take on
excessive  risks. Inadequately  reported  nonperforming  loans are most likely  to be a large  factor of
data distortion in emerging markets with weak enforcement  of banking regulation. In such
countries a bank efficiency model  might estimate  a bank to be in better shape that they actually
are. In fact, the most efficient banks  of a banking  system  as measured  by a bank efficiency  model
are not necessarily  the least risky banks. In the case of East Asia it seems likely  than inadequate
loan loss provisions  were a large factor of data distortion  as well, because,  until 1997,  loans were
not classified as nonperforming  loans until no payments  were made for over one year, leading  to
underreporting  of bad loans to regulators.
The extremely  high loan growths  in the five East  Asian countries  during the period 1992-
96 (up to  151% for the Philippines - see Appendix, Table 4) suggest excessive risk taking
behaviour of the East Asian banks. Since the technical efficiency measure does not take into
account that excessive loan growth can indicate excessive  risk taking instead of increased  bank
performance, technical  bank  efficiency measures are  not  a  perfect  indicator for  bank
performance,  but are merely an indicator  for how well banks are in transforming  their inputs  into
loans, both bad and good loans. Especially  in countries  where poor regulatory frameworks  and
weak enforcement of banking regulations enable banks to take  excessive risks, technical
efficiency  measures  will provide  a misleading  insight  in the performance  of banks.
The earlier  mentioned  studies by Leightner  and Lovell (1997),  Leightner  (1997), Gilbert
and Wilson (1998) and Hao et al. (1999) on Thai and Korean banking  data use traditional  bank
efficiency  measures  to assess the bank performance.  We argue that their results are misleading.
Leightner  and Lovell (1997), for example,  find that Thai banks experienced  high loan growth
rates during the period 1990-94  and argue that high growth rates indicate an unusual level of
success of the banking system. For Korea, Hao et al. (1999) find that banks with faster loan
growth  rates were most efficient during  the period 1985-95.  Although  these high loan  growths  do
indicate a  success in terms of generating  loans one cannot draw general conclusions  on the
success  of the banking  system without looking  at the risk of these loans. Ex-post we know that
high loan growth of Thai and Korean banks was a sign of excessive  lending, not of excellent
performance.
8Since the technical  bank efficiency  measure cannot distinguish between excessive risk
taking and increased bank performance we will develop in this section a measure of excessive
loan growth that can be used as a proxy for  bank risk taking. Excessive  loan  growth will be
defined as being growth above the level of loans that a bank would have provided if it would
have put its inputs at use as efficiently as in a defined base year. In the previous section we have
argued  that  DEA  might  be  most suitable  for  examining the  efficiency  of East  Asian  banks,
because  it can be used even if regulations and other market imperfections distort prices, as is
likely to be the  case  in  the East Asian  banking sector.  We therefore  decide to use the  DEA
technique to measure efficiency, which is an input for our measure of excessive credit growth.
Taking model (1)-(5) in section 2 as a starting point, let  yfi  be the amount of loans of
bankf  in base year t and  y f(t+T)  the amount of loans of bankf  in year t+  T. Let  Of' be the inverse
of the output-oriented measure of efficiency of bankf  in year t calculated using DEA. We will
assume that slacks are zero. Then the efficient level of loans for bankf  in year t given its inputs
in year t would be 9yf/l  and the efficient level of loans for bankf  in year t+T given its inputs in
year t+ T would be  oft(t+T)yf(t+T)  . However, with T small, there is no a priori  reason to assume a
major change in efficiency, hence in 9f , between year t and t+ T. Therefore, one would expect a
9 f(t+T)  f(t+T)
loan  level in year  t+T  of  Y  instead of the actual level  y f(t+T).  The difference
y
9 f(t+T)  f(t+T)
between  y f(t+T)  and  Y  9:  can be classified as the amount of excessive loans. We will
1  ~~~~Oft
y
f f(t+T)  f(t+T)
f(t+T)  _y  Yi
Yi  Ofy  jlf(I+T)Fi  f(I+T)
thus  define  excessive  loan  growth  as  y  oras  ''L19'gY  .
Taking the year  1992 as the base year and the 1992 efficiency figures as the benchmark
and assuming a constant efficiency  over 5 years we define the following as a measure of bank
risk-taking for the purpose of our application to East Asian banking data for the period 1992-96
in the following section
yf  ,1996  of  ,1996
Rf  (9 f,1992  of,1996)  =  V1  - . (7) f  1992  9 f,1992
9where  yf,9 92 and yf, 996 are loan levels of bankfin  1992 and 1996 respectively, and  0f"992  and
gf,1996  are the inverse of the output-oriented  measure  of efficiency  of bank f calculated  using
y
DEA in year 1992 and 1996  respectively.  Our measure  of risk-taking  focuses  on excessive  loan
growth and does not take into account  that banks also made excessive  investments  in securities.
However,  in comparison  to their lending  operations  East Asian banks invested  a relatively  small
amount in securities (see Appendix, Table 4). It is likely that in  1992, banks already took
excessive  risks. Our risk measure, however,  does not include the risk acquired until 1992,  and
thus only measures  additional  risk taken during 1992-96.
3. Overview  of the East Asian Financial  Sectors
The financial systems of Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  Philippines  and Thailand  have long been
dominated  by commercial  banks.  In all countries  the commercial  banking  sector is dominated  by
a few large domestic commercial  banks with extensive  branch networks.  Foreign banks, which
are often disadvantaged  by a number of restrictions, account for a relatively small amount of
bank assets and mostly provide trade finance to  multinational  firms. Other large groups of
financial institutions are the finance companies in Malaysia and Thailand, and the merchant
banks in Korea.
Finance  companies  and merchant  banks faced more  restrictions  and engaged  in different
activities than commercial  banks. Thai finance companies,  for example,  were not allowed to
mobilise  demand or time deposits,  but were only permitted  to issue fixed-term  promissory  notes
and certificates  of deposits to fund their businesses.  In view of these restrictions, Thai finance
companies  could not effectively  compete  for most of the commercial  bank mainstream  business,
and were largely left to engage in more risky activities.  Commercial  banks had more freedom  to
choose their business mix and faced similar  restrictions  across countries.  For the above reasons,
we exclude finance companies and merchant banks from our analysis and focus only on
commercial  banks.
The local commercial  banks in all five East Asian countries  were originally  set up by the
State, a handful of families who controlled  large enterprises  (such as rice farms in the case of
Thailand),  or by trading houses. Despite  attempts  by the government  to diversify  the ownership
of the local commercial  banks, Indonesian  and Thai commercial  banks are still dominated  by a
handful of families. All the banks have powerful connections  with the local and international
business community and  with the  government. In  Korea, the  largest banks are typically
10connected to a large conglomerate, the so-called chaebol,  by acting as the main bank. The State
is involved in the commercial banks through ownership of large savings banks that are important
for channelling private savings to investment projects.
All five East Asian financial sectors had financial liberalisation, a weak regulatory and
supervisory framework, poor risk management and excessive lending in common. But there were
differences  in  magnitudes  and  origins. 2 In  1983, Indonesia  started to  liberalise  its  financial
system, after  declining  oil  prices  in  1982 had  led to a  devaluation  of the  rupiah.  The main
financial sector reform was the dismantling of the credit ceiling system, that was imposed in the
1970s in order to control credit growth and money supply. The reform was directed to private
banks only. For state banks, credit restrictions remained in place. In fact, Indonesian state banks
had limits on their asset growth up to the crisis year 1997.
Montes et al. (1998) argues that the flexibility to extend credit led private banks to take
on  more  risky  projects,  while  state banks, hampered  by  cumbersome procedures  in granting
loans, were more successful in attracting deposits, as they owned large branch networks and were
considered  less risky  by the public, who assumed an implied government guarantee. To foster
competition, Indonesia introduced another financial reforn  package in 1988, which included the
reduction  of bank reserve  requirements  from 15 to 2 percent of assets, and permitting  public
sector entities to place up to 50 percent of their deposits outside state banks.
Montes et al. (1998) reports that the introduction of these measures  led to an explosive
growth of new banks from 124 in 1988 to 244 in 1994. The increased competition, subsequently,
led most of Indonesia's  large conglomerates to set up or acquire at least one bank. As in the other
countries, financial liberalisation  sparked a lending boom in Indonesia, with large exposures to
the  property development  sector.  Since the private  banks showed the  largest growth of loans
during the  1990s and had significant cross-ownership links with other financial institutions and
conglomerates,  Montes et al. (1998) argues that they did not necessarily fare better  in terms of
their loan performance than did state-owned banks.
In  Korea,  the  government  provided  priority  strategic  sectors  and  industries  with
subsidised credit through a government-directed banking system and protected them from foreign
competition.  This nurtured the large chaebols in the  1960s and 70s.  After privatisation  of the
banks, the chaebols  were allowed to take minority stakes in the banks of up to 5% only. Because
of this restriction the large Korean banks became publicly and widely owned. According to Ha-
Joon (1998), the chaebols have  become more  independent of the government, as they  started
2 See Claessens  and Glaessner  (1997) for an overview  of the financial  sector  weaknesses  in East  Asia.
11gaining direct access to  international capital markets and acquired controlling stakes in certain
minor regional banks. However, instead of focusing on long-term value-adding investments only
Korea's conglomerates also bought up a substantial amount of real estate and speculated heavily
on the stock market, mostly financed with short-term debt. Bullard et al. (1998) reports that by
1996, total  bank  exposure  to  real  estate  reached  25  percent, higher  than  either  Thailand or
Indonesia, and according to Ha-Joon (1998) the share of Korea's  short-term debt in total debt
rose to over 58 percent in 1996. The result of this investment boom was that the financial state of
Korea's  conglomerates deteriorated. Bullard et al. (1998) reports that by  1996, the top 20 listed
Korean companies were earning a mere 3 percent on assets, while the average cost to borrowing
had risen to 8.2 percent, and the average debt to equity ratio had risen to 220 percent.
In Thailand,  financial liberalisation in 1992 enabled commercial banks to borrow more
freely in foreign currencies from abroad, which subsequently led to substantial borrowing from
abroad and a high level of investments. Lauridsen (1998) reports that during the 1990-96 period,
the  investment ratio was over 40  percent and that by August 1997 the foreign debt was about
US$  90 billion, of which  US$ 20 billion was due by the end of 1997. The massive inflow of
money caused a misallocation of investment resources and a boom-bust cycle involving property
and  stock markets.  Lauridsen  (1998) reports that  loans from financial  institutions to  property
developers tripled during the period 1992-1996 causing inflated assets in the real estate  sector.
Not only the Thai commercial banks contributed to the lending boom, but the 91 Thai finance
companies as well.
In Malaysia, major companies borrowed heavily from abroad as well, at least until 1994
when restrictions on foreign borrowing were put into place. However, compared to Thailand and
Indonesia, a lower share of foreign borrowing was of a short-term nature and a higher proportion
was hedged. But as in the other countries, Malaysia also seems to have misallocated investments.
According  to Jomo  (1998),  in the  period  1992-96 more  than  70  percent  of bank  lending  in
Malaysia  has not been  for  investments in manufacturing, agriculture  or mining,  but for  other
purposes, most notably real property and share purchases.
The story of the Philippines slightly differs, since the Philippines entered the 1990s with
an  economic  recession,  while the  other  four countries  seemed to  fare well  under  export-led
growth. The Philippine financial system has been small compared to the other four East Asian
countries, because  high inflation has  discouraged household  savings. In  1992, the Philippines
agreed to a debt restructuring program based on the Brady plan which converted loans into long-
tern  bonds, and started to liberalise its financial system by easing the entry of banks. Financial
12liberalisation  also  allowed  unhedged  foreign  borrowings,  which,  as Lim  (1998)  notes,  was
attractive because the central bank's policy of a stable currency made sure that domestic interest
rates were above foreign  rates. Financial liberalisation without sufficient prudential  regulation
and enforcement by the central bank led also in the Philippines to an overexposure to risky loans,
especially real estate loans, foreign borrowings and consumer loans to high risk groups.
4. Data
The data used in this study are taken from BankScope, which is a rich source for balance sheet
and profit & loss account data for individual banks across the world. In order to  estimate the
bank efficiencies  we have gathered  the following variables:  interest expenses on deposits and
borrowings,  personnel  expenses, operating expenses (on equipment, building, machinery, etc.),
net loans (equal to gross loans or credit plus accrued interest minus loan losses), and investments
in  securities  (including  securities  purchased  with  a  resale  agreement). In  addition,  we  have
collected data on total assets, deposits, equity capital, loan loss provisions, short-term borrowings
(domestic  and  foreign)  and  ownership  structures.  The  data  is  on  54  commercial  banks  in
Indonesia, 25 in Korea, 34  in Malaysia, 29 in the Philippines, and 29 in Thailand for the years
1992-963  (see Appendix, Tables 1-4, for summary statistics of the data).
The coverage of the data is quite good. In terms of bank loans, the coverage of the total
commercial banking system by our sample of commercial banks is about 70% in Indonesia, 90%
in the Philippines, 98% in both Korea and Malaysia, and 100% in Thailand. In terms of number
of commercial banks, the coverage by our sample is 23% in Indonesia, 96% in Korea, 97% in
Malaysia, 57% in the Philippines and 100% in Thailand (see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2).
We  consider  five  different  ownership  forms:  state-owned,  family-owned,  company-
owned, foreign-owned, and widely-owned (dispersed ownership). The ownership category state-
owned means that  the  state is a  majority shareholder. Family-owned means that  a handful of
families own the majority of the voting rights. Majority ownership is defined as having over 33%
of the  voting  rights,  which  in general  is  identical  to  owning  more than  33% of the  shares,
although  in  some cases  there  is a  large  difference  between  ownership  of control  rights and
ownership  of cash flow rights.  Similarly, company-owned means that a  handful of companies
own the majority of the voting rights and foreign-owned means that the financial institution is
3 However,  data are not available  for all banks  for all five  years.  For Malaysia,  no data was available  for
1993,  and for 1994  only for a few  of the large  banks.
13owned  mainly by foreigners.  Widely-owned  means  that there are no majority  owners,  but that the
shares  are widely-held,  possibly amongst  some minority  owners,  who each own between  5% and
33% of shares.
Ownership  is thought to be related to a financial institution's  performance,  because  the
incentives  for managers  to efficiently allocate resources  might differ under different ownership
arrangements.  If owners do not have the incentive or capability to  monitor the activity of
management,  then agency problems  and subsequent  costs are thought  to increase.  In particular  it
is  expected that  foreign-owned banks will be  relatively efficient, because their corporate
governance  is of international  standards.  In addition,  it is expected  that company-owned,  family-
owned and state-owned banks are relatively inefficient. Company-owned  and family-owned
banks are likely to  suffer from poor governance and connected lending. In particular, the
company  or family might be tempted  to use the bank to finance their own  businesses.  In terms of
efficiency,  state-ownership  is in general  thought  to be inferior  to private  ownership.
The ownership structure of  banks differs substantially  among the  five East Asian
countries (see Appendix, Tables 1 and 3). Indonesian  commercial  banks are predominantly
owned by the state, families and companies, Korean banks are predominantly  widely-held,
Malaysian and Philippine banks are predominantly  owned by companies, and Thai domestic
banks are predominantly  owned by families.  However,  in terms of total controlled  commercial
banks assets, the  dominant ownership forms are state-ownership  and family-ownership  in
Indonesia (both control 37%), dispersed ownership in Korea (56%), company-ownership  in
Malaysia (56%), company-ownership  in  the Philippines (57%), and family-ownership  and
dispersed ownership in Thailand (both control 36%). In East Asia, family-ownership  is not
unique  to the banking sector. Claessens  et al. (1999a) show that in most East Asian countries,
ownership  of corporations  (including  banks) is concentrated  in the hands of a few families,  and
that there are extensive links between corporations  and the governments.  For all countries  each
of the collected  variables (if averaged  across  banks)  has increased  substantially  during  the period
1992-96  (see Appendix, Table 4)4.  Some variables even show growth rates up to 287% for this
period, such as the amount of short term borrowing  by Indonesian  banks. These growth  rates are
a sign of excessive  growth  and risk taking of the East  Asian banks  during  the period 1992-96.
4These  figures  include  the annual  inflation  rates  which  were  on  average  9%  in Indonesia,  5%  in South
Korea,  4%  in Malaysia,  8%  in the  Philippines  and  5%  in Thailand  during  1992-96  (Source:  IFS,  IMF).
145. Methodology
We will analyse the efficiency of banks in one framework, i.e. within a country we will relate all
types of commercial banks for all years to the same 'grand  frontier'.  We estimate such a 'grand
frontier'  for each country to allow for differences across countries. The problems of using one
frontier  are that not all banks in a given country operate in the same environment, and that the
environment in which banks operate might change over time. The inefficiencies of state-owned
banks, for example, might have been caused by quite different factors than those of the privately-
owned banks as within all five countries they operated in a different regulatory and supervisory
framework,  had  different  funding  costs  and  had  small  overlap  in  client  groups  with  the
commercial banks. These differences are, however, relatively small. Also, bank efficiency is not
constant  over  time.  However,  our  sample  period  is  relatively  short  (1992-96)  and,  with
liberalisation measures mostly imposed by 1992, covers a period with relatively minor changes in
banking laws. The advantage of using one frontier is that within a given country we are able to
compare the efficiencies of all types of banks with each other across time. Therefore, we decide
to calculate for each country the combined frontier of all the banks for all years, realising that we
are  making  the  strong  assumption  that  all  banks  in  a  given  country  operate  in  the  same
environment during our sample period.
Given the high credit growths it is most likely that the goal of the East Asian banks has
been  output  maximisation  instead  of  input  minimisation.  We  will  therefore  use  the  output
orientation to calculate technical inefficiency. This means that we assume that East Asian banks
seek to maximise their service provision, given the resources at their disposal. We will specify
the following variables  for the  model (1)-(5). The input variables  (x) include interest expense
( x),  labour expense ( x2), other operating expense (  X3 ). The output variables (y) include loans
(y),  and  securities  (Y2).  Our variable  specification follows  the  intermediation approach  to
modelling bank production. Nonperforming loans are not included as an environmental variable.
The reason for this is that nonperforming loans are likely to be endogenous, meaning that they
are caused by bad management or monitoring of the loan portfolio. Nonperforming loans would
be exogenous if caused by negative economic shocks. These shocks are likely to affect all banks
in the same way and are therefore expected to have similar impacts on each banks profit.
Since we relate the efficiency of individual banks in each of the five East Asian countries
to a 'country grand frontier'  and since the initial conditions of these five countries were different,
we  cannot  compare  the  estimated  bank  efficiencies  across  countries.  However,  changes  in
15efficiency  are comparable  across countries,  since it is likely  that there were only minor  or similar
changes in the bank environment  of the five countries during the period 1992-96.  We can thus
pool the data on efficiency  across countries  and time. This increases  the number  of observations
and therefore  the power of our tests.
To explain the variation in changes in output efficiencies through time we specify a
second-step  regression  model. For each country,  the second-step  regression  model  is specified  as
a two-factor  fixed  effects model with ownership  dummies
J  K
,(xf  ,yftg)=ao  +ag +a, +  8jABtg +  5k  Dg  + ft',  (8)
j=l  k=1
where Ey(xf', yf')  is the vector of efficiencies  calculated  in the first step using DEA, a,  /  and
8  are vectors to be estimated, B  f'  is a matrix of J explanatory  variables for bank  f  in period t,
A  denotes  that a variable is in first differences,  for example, ABf = Bft - Bft 1), g denotes  one
of the five countries, D  f[g  are ownership  dummies  corresponding  to K different  ownership  forms
and -ftg is normally distributed with mean zero and variance cr2.  Equation (8) has an overall
constant  (ao ) as well as a country  effect for each of the five countries  (ag ) and a time effect for
each period (at).  As explanatory  variables we include the capital adequacy ratio', the ratio of
loan loss provisioning  to loans, the amount of loans, and the amount of short term borrowings.
The capital adequacy  ratio and the ratio of loan loss provisioning  to loans are to a large extent
imposed  upon the banks by the regulators.  They  are included  as explanatory  variables,  because  it
is likely that, while imposing  their rules upon the banks, regulators  discriminated  across banks
and that regulators  became  more lax regarding  enforcement  of their rules during  the period 1992-
96, as it became  clear to them that some banks were facing  financial difficulties.  An increase in
the amount  of loans, and especially  an increase  in the amount  of short termn  borrowings  is a good
indicator  for the degree of bank risk-taking.  They are included  as explanatory  variables  because
risk-taking  is likely to be related  to changes  in bank efficiency.  All explanatory  variables are in
first differences. To avoid multicollinearity  in  estimating (8), we will suppress one of the
ownership  dummies.
We will use the DEA calculated  efficiency  measures  to calculate our measure of risk-
taking. The measure of risk-taking is comparable  across countries, since it is likely that there
were only minor or similar differences in risk-taking  behaviour  across the five countries during
S We  have  calculated  capital  adequacy  ratios  as  the  ratio  of equity  capital  to the sum  of  loans  and  securities.
16the period 1992-96.  We can thus pool the data across countries. This increases the number of
observations  and therefore the power of our tests. We specify the following  one-factor fixed
effects model with ownership dummies  to explain differences in risk-taking  behaviour  among
banks and across countries
J  K
Rfg =ag +  _  ,jBfg+  SDfr+6f,  (9)
j=l  ksl
where g denotes  one of the five countries, Rfg is our risk-taking  estimate  for bankf in country  g,
Dfg  are ownership  dummies,  and Efg is normally distributed  with mean zero and variance a2
Instead  of an overall constant,  model  (9) has a country  effect for each of the five countries  (ag).
As explanatory  variables we include the market share of bank assets in 19926,  the growth in the
ratio of loan loss provisioning  to loans during the period 1992-96  and the growth in short-term
borrowing  during the period 1992-96.  The market share of banks  assets in 1992  is included  as an
initial condition  to control for a possible size effect. It is expected  that small banks are likely to
take more  risk than large banks in their efforts to become  big as well. The growth in the ratio of
loan loss provisioning to  loans is included to correct for a  possible discrimination by the
regulator of banks in imposing provisioning rules. The growth in  short-term borrowing is
included because  high short-term  debt was a key factor behind  the financial  difficulties  of many
banks, and  is  therefore  expected to  be  positively linked to  bank  risk-taking. To  avoid
multicollinearity  we will suppress  one of the ownership  dummies.
6. Empirical Findings
The  DEA  efficiency  results  are  obtained  from  applying model  (1)-(5) to  estimate  a  'grand
frontier'.  As noted  before,  the  'grand  frontier'  approach implicitly assumes that there  are no
changes in technology, regulation, and market environment during the period 1992-96 that affect
bank efficiency.  Since the  sample of banks is large enough not to put too many banks on the
efficiency frontier, we decide to use the VRS results.
For the period 1992-96, our DEA efficiency estimates (see Appendix, Table 5) show that
for all five East Asian countries bank efficiency did not decrease significantly. For Indonesia, the
Philippines  and  Thailand we see  a substantial increase in efficiency, and Korea  and Malaysia
6 The asset market  share of bankf in countryj is defined  as the amount  of assets  of bankf in 1992  divided
by the total  amount  of assets  of all banks  in countryj in 1992.
17stay roughly  constant at their initial levels.  This is a surprising  result,  since one would expect  that
bank efficiency  in these countries  would be lower in 1996,  one year before the crisis year 1997,
than in  1992, that is,  if in this case bank efficiency is indeed a good indicator for bank
performance.  However,  this may not be  the case, since  during the same period  all five countries
experienced  extremely  high loan growths  (up to 151%  for the Philippines  - see Appendix,  Table
4)7. Ex-post we know that a substantial part of those loans were actually non-performing,  and
therefore risky. The strong correlation between efficiency growth and loan growth makes it
evident that in the case of East Asia, where non-performing  loans have been underestimated  or
not  fully reported, technical bank  efficiency estimates are not  a  good indicator for  the
performance  of banks, but are merely an indicator  for how well banks were in transforming  their
inputs into loans, both bad and good loans. The technical efficiency  measure,  therefore,  does not
take into account that excessive loan growth can indicate excessive risk taking instead of
increased  bank performance.
To explain the variation  in DEA-estimated  bank efficiency  both across  ownership  groups
and through time we have estimated  the two-factor  fixed effects regression model specified in
equation (8). Detailed results can be found in the Appendix  (Regression  1). After correcting  for
bank-specific  effects, we find that family-owned  and foreign-owned  banks  showed  an increase  in
efficiency  relative to other banks and that widely-owned  banks showed a decrease in efficiency
relative to other banks across the region during the period 1992-96.  A second result is that on
average Philippine banks showed an relative increase in efficiency and Malaysian banks a
decrease in efficiency  relative to banks in the other three countries.  We also find a positive  time
effect for the change in efficiency  of the region's banking  sector during 1992-93,  and a negative
time effect during 1994-95.  Most importantly,  we find that high loan growth is significantly
correlated  with an increase in efficiency among all countries 8. We find a correlation of 36%,
which confirns  our view that bank efficiency measures cannot perfectly distinguish bank
performance  from excessive  credit growth.  We  thus need  to correct for bank risk taking.
For each bank across all five countries we have calculated  our risk-taking  measure in
equation (7). Our findings across different ownership groups are summarised in Box I (see
Appendix,  Table 6 for further details), where we have  defined 'high risk' as having  a relatively
high measure  of risk-taking  during the period 1992-96.  Box I also reports  the share of bank assets
7 These  figures  are  inclusive  of  the  inflation  rate.  The  real  growth  of bank  loans  were  extremely  high  as  well
(for  example,  11  1% in the  Philippines).
s This  result  also  holds  if we  do not  pool  the efficiency  data  across  countries.
18as of end 1996 (between brackets)  to find out how well distributed our findings are across the
different risk-taking  groups.
Box I  Relative risk-taking  across ownership  groups
Country  High Risk  Medium  Risk  Low Risk
Indonesia  Family  Company  State,  Widely,  Foreign
(37.2%)  (15.7%)  (47.1%)
Korea  State  Widely,  Foreign  Company
(30.5%)  (62.9%)  (6.6%)
Malaysia  Widely"*,  Company  State,  Family  Foreign
(64.7%)  (13.0%)  (22.2%)
Philippines  Company,  Foreign  Family  State, Widely
(66.8%)  (10.1%)  (23.0%)
Thailand  Foreign  State,  Widely  Family**
(8.6%)  (55.6%)  (35.8%)
** Significantly  different  from average  at a 5% level;  * Significantly  different  from average  at a 10%  level
We  find  a  reasonably good distribution across risk-taking groups for  all  countries. An
explanation  for Indonesian  state-owned  banks having a low risk is that for the period 1992-96
they were limited by the regulator in their asset growth. In fact, they were operating under an
implicit ceiling on their loan growth. Their market share in loans dropped significantly  as a
consequence.
To explain the variation in risk-taking  across ownership  groups we have estimated  the
one-factor  fixed effects regression  model specified in equation (9). Our findings  are summarised
in Box II (see Appendix, Regression 2.a-b for further details), where we define 'high risk' as
having a relatively high measure of risk-taking  during the period 1992-96  after correcting  for
bank-specific  effects.
Box II  Relative risk-taking  (pooled  regression  results)
Variahle  High Risk  Medium  Risk  . Low Risk
Ownership  Family*, Company*  *  Widely  . State*, Foreign*
Country  Indonesia*, Philippines*  Thailand  . Korea*, Malaysia*
** Significantly  different  from average  at a 5% level;  * Significantly  different  from  average  at a 10%  level
19We find that across countries state-owned  and foreign-owned  banks took least risk (in terms of
our defined  measure  of risk-taking),  and that family-owned  and company-owned  banks  took most
risk. A second result is that Indonesian  and Philippine  banks  took relatively  more  risk than banks
from the other three countries. We also find that banks with large increases in short-term
borrowings  were riskier. Although the results show a negative  relationship  between bank risk
taking  and bank size (i.e., small  banks took more  risk), this size  effect is not significant.
Note that these results do not take into account that some banks operated under more
restrictions  than others. For example,  the bank regulator  might have  been more lax towards  state-
owned  banks in imposing  its rules. It is, however,  likely that foreign  banks were not favoured  by
any of these rules and restrictions. Given the fact that foreign banks were disadvantaged  by a
number of restrictions 9, especially in comparison  with state banks,  we might conclude from the
above results that foreign banks were the best performers  in terms of taking the least risk.
Besides being favoured in terms of having  fewer restrictions  and more lax regulation,  a possible
explanation  for the result that state-owned  banks took relatively risk, might be that the credit
growth of state banks in Indonesia,  which comprise  a large part of our sample of state-owned
banks, was restricted during the period 1992-96.  An explanation  for the second result might be
that family-owned  and company-owned  banks engaged  more  intensively  into insider  lending  than
state-owned,  foreign-owned  and widely-held  banks, because  of their more intimate  relationships
between shareholders  and bank managers.
The risk-measure  we have defined in equation (12) is a function of the change in bank
efficiency.  Therefore,  any relationship  we would find between the change in efficiency  and our
measure of risk-taking  would be an artefact of our definition.  However,  this problem does not
arise when we relate risk-taking  to the initial level of efficiency (in the year 1992) only. The
relationship between our measure of risk-taking  and the DEA calculated technical efficiency
measure in 1992 is negative  for all five countries.  This means that banks that were efficient in
1992  took less risk during  the period  that followed  (1992-96).
Since all  banks experienced loan growths over the  period  1992-96, the  implicit
relationship  between our measure  of risk-taking  and decreases  in efficiency is negative.  This is
the relationship  we would expect, because  banks that show a large decrease in efficiency  during
1992-96  took on less loans (ceteris  paribus) and therefore less risk. A bank typified as being
highly inefficient by traditional technical efficiency measures might thus have withstood the
crisis simply  because it took on relatively  few (risky)  loans.
9  Foreign  banks  faced  for example  restrictions  on  the  number  of branches  they  could  have.
207. Risk-taking and Bank Restructuring
A  major  cause  of  the  East  Asian  financial  crisis was  the  weak regulatory  and  supervisory
frameworks  set  by  the East  Asian  governments and  central  banks. Although  the  East  Asian
governments have been too lax in enforcing their rules in the past, there are signs that they are
making efforts to prevent such mismanagement in the future. The East Asian governments have
already  taken  many  actions  to  restructure  the  banking systems'°.  In Indonesia,  so  far,  bank
restructuring has affected  146 of the 237 commercial banks - 50 commercial  banks have been
shut down, another 26 commercial banks have been taken over by the government restructuring
agency  IBRA,  and  another  54  commercial  banks  have  become  directly  controlled  by  the
government. In addition, four of the seven state banks are to merge and  12 commercial banks
have been nationalised. In Korea, four of the 26 commercial banks have been nationalised, five
commercial banks have been absorbed into other institutions, and 2 commercial banks have been
sold to foreigners. In addition,  16 of the 30 merchant banks and 10 of 25 leasing companies have
been shut down.  Since the Malaysian  government has opted for absorption, there has been no
closure  of  any  of  35  commercial  banks  or  39  finance companies.  Thus  far,  two  Malaysian
commercial banks  have been absorbed by other entities, and  16 Malaysian finance companies
have been absorbed by parent banks. There are plans to merge the remaining 58 institutions into
6 groups. In the Philippines no banks have been closed down. The Philippine government and
central bank encourage consolidation of banks instead. Two major banks have already merged. In
Thailand, one of the  15 commercial banks has been closed down, two commercial banks have
been nationalised,  and two  commercial banks  have been  absorbed by  government entities. In
addition, 55 of the 91 finance companies have been closed down, and 16 finance companies have
been absorbed by other entities. Finally, Thai banking legislation has been changed so that it is
easier for foreigners to buy into Thai financial institutions.
If our risk-taking measure correctly measures excessive risk-taking by banks we would
expect that  our measure  of risk-taking is higher for banks that have been restructured than for
banks that  have not been restructured. We will classify a bank as being restructured  if it was
either suspended, re-capitalised, merged, taken over, nationalised or closed down after 1997. The
14 foreign-owned  banks  in Thailand are  all branches  of foreign banks, and  can therefore  be
supported  by  the  parent  if  necessary.  As  a  consequence,  none  of these  banks  have  been
restructured. We therefore exclude them from this ex-post analysis in order to prevent distortion
'° Source:  Goldman  Sachs  Investment  Research;  Claessens  et al. (1999b).  All figures  as of Sept. 1999.
21of our results, which leaves us a sample  of 156  banks. We indeed  find for all five countries  that
banks that have been restructured since the onset of the financial  crisis took more risk during
1992-96  in terms of our risk measure  than banks  that have  not been  restructured  (see Table 7). To
assess the explanatory  power of our risk measure in more detail we have estimated a binomial
logit regression  model with a binary restructuring  variable  that takes value one if the bank has
been restructured and zero if the bank has not been restructured as dependent variable. We
include bank assets in 1992 as explanatory  variable  to control for a possible size effect,  and add
country  dummies  and ownership  dummies  to control for country  and ownership  effects.  We thus
pool the data across the five countries. The results from the binomial  logit model indicate  that
our risk measure has explanatory power in terms of predicting which banks were to  be
restructured  after 1997,  i.e. the regression  coefficient  of the risk measure  variable  is significant  at
a 1% level. The binomial  logit model is quite powerful;  it predicts  restructuring  correctly  in 77%
of cases. A summary  of our findings is presented in Box III (see Appendix, Regression  3 for
further  details).
Box  HI  Bank restructuring  (binomial  logit regression  results)
Many restructured banks among  Few restructured banks among
Risk-taking  Banks  that took a lot of risk**  Banks  that took little risk**
Bank size  Large banks**  Small  banks**
Ownership  Family-owned  and company-owned  banks**  Foreign-owned  banks**
Country  Korean and Thai banks**  Indonesian,  Malaysian,  and
Philippine  banks**
**  Significantly different from average at a 5% level; * Significantly different from average at a 10% level
Not only do we find that banks that were restructured  had excessive  credit growth  in terns of our
defined measure of risk-taking,  but we also find that a relatively high number of restructured
banks was family-owned  or company-owned,  an average  number  was state-owned  or widely-held
and a relatively small number was foreign-owned.  In addition,  we find that a relatively higher
number  of restructured  banks among  Korean or Thai banks  than among  Indonesian,  Malaysian  or
Philippine  banks. This result might indicate  that the latter three countries  have not made  a lot of
progress with the restructuring of their banking sectors. Finally, we find that large banks (in
terms  of assets) were more likely  to be restructured  than small banks.
22The  risk  measure  performs  better  in  predicting  bank  restructuring  than  the  more
straightforward  measure of loan growth. Estimation of the previous binomial logit model with
the average annual loan growth during the period 1992-96 as explanatory variable instead of our
risk  measure  gives  an  insignificant  coefficient  for  the  loan  growth variable  (see  Appendix,
Regression 4 for further  details). Although the risk measure is based upon loan growth during
1992-96, it follows  that  the  risk  measure contains  additional  useful  information,  namely the
change in the efficiency of the bank (see equation (7)). In fact, the correlation between average
annual loan growth and the risk measure is only 32%. The above suggests that the risk measure
developed in this paper can be a useful tool for assessing the risk of a bank.
8. Conclusions
We  have  used a  linear  programming  technique  called Data  Envelopment Analysis  (DEA)  to
estimate the efficiencies of the commercial banks in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand for the years 1992-96. In this particular case, we found that in assessing the overall
performance of a bank it is not enough to look at efficiency measures only, but that risk factors
should be taken into account as well. The best bank is not simply the most efficient producer of
loans, but is a bank that combines high efficiency with low risk-taking. We therefore introduced
a measure of risk-taking based upon the well-established efficiency measure that enabled us to
assess the overall performance of banks.
Our findings are that foreign-owned banks took little risk relative to other banks in the
East Asian region, and that family-owned banks, were among the most risky banks, together with
company-owned banks. Our risk measure does better than credit growth alone in predicting bank
restructuring after the crisis of 1997. Not only do we find that banks that were restructured had
excessive credit growth, but we also find that the restructured banks were mostly family-owned
or company-owned, and almost never foreign-owned.
The  results  of our  risk-taking model  indicate that  family  and  company ownership  of
banks should be discouraged, and that foreigners should be encouraged to become core group of
investors of banks.  These conclusions  should, however,  be interpreted with caution given the
sensitivity of our technical methods. In particular, our analysis might have overlooked that some
banks operated under more restrictions than others. It is, however, likely that foreign banks were
not favoured by any of these rules and restrictions. We therefore argue that banking regulation
23should  be such that all banks, including  foreign  banks,  can compete  on an arms-length  bases and
that foreign  ownership  of East Asian banks  should  be encouraged.
Since it is impossible  to separate  efficiency  improvements  from excessive  risk taking,  we
have  assumed  that efficiency  is constant  during 1992-96  in order to construct  our measure  of risk
taking. Of course, bank efficiency  is not constant  over time, even for a relatively short period  of
5 years with no significant changes in bank management  and bank regulation.  However, the
increases  in estimated  efficiency  that we see for most banks  in our sample  are clearly  overstated,
since a lot of those banks entered financial distress or even bankruptcy  after 1997. It seems
evident that on average the increase in calculated  efficiency  was mainly (in most cases even
completely) due to excessive risk-taking  instead of a true increase in efficiency/performance.
Therefore,  although  we acknowledge  that our risk measure  is only a rough estimate  of bank risk
taking,  we argue  that on average our risk measure  should  give a good indication  of the extent of
risk taking across  banks.
Traditional bank efficiency  measures  do not only disregard  the risk profile of a bank's
business,  but they also suffer from the limitation  that they do not account for business  mix, the
quality of service, and exogenous shocks. Although  we have made an attempt to take the risk
profile of a bank's  business into account by assessing a  bank's risk-taking behaviour, our
measure  still suffers from not accounting  for business mix and the quality of service. Accurate
data on a sectoral breakdown  of extended loans might be used to account for business  mix, but
further  research is needed  to develop  methods  that will enable us to assess the performance  of a
bank given  its accounting  data.
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26Appendix  Tables and Figures
Table  1  Overview  of commercial  banking  sector  (as of end 1996)
Number  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand
Local  193  25  23  31  14
Foreign  44  1  12  20  15
Total  237  26  35  51  29
Source:  Central  banks,  Goldman  Sachs.  In addition,  Korea has 30 merchant  banks,  and 25 leasing  companies,  Malaysia
has 39 finance  companies,  and Thailand  has 91 finance  companies.
Table  2  Sample  number  of commercial  banks  (as of end 1996)
Ownership  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand
State-owned  6  4  2  1  3
Family  16  0  1  6  8
Company  17  5  18  13  0
Widely  2  15  2  3  4
Foreign  13  1  11  6  14
Total  54  25  34  29  29
Source: BankScope,  World Bank. Korean figures are excluding merchant  banks; Malaysian  figures are excluding
merchant  banks  and finance  companies;  Thai figures  are excluding  finance  companies.
Table 3  Share of commercial bank assets by ownership (includes sample only)
Ownership  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand
State-owned  37.4  30.5  12.8  13.2  20.0
Family  37.2  0  0.2  10.1  35.8
Company  15.7  6.6  56.2  56.5  0
Widely  6.2  55.5  8.5  9.8  35.6
Foreign  3.5  7.4  22.2  10.3  8.6
Source:  BankScope;  World  Bank;  Bank of Thailand.
27Table 4  Summary statistics for Asian banks 1992-96 (standard deviation between brackets)
Country  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Growth (in °/)
Loans  Indonesia  1759  2048  2441  3022  3787  115%
(4102)  (4307)  (4454)  (5265)  (6407)
Korea  5650  5613  6741  7875  9381  66%
(4666)  (5163)  (5899)  (6692)  (7937)
Malaysia  - *  5985  6973  8927  49%
- *  (7840)  (9375)  (11060)
Philippines  13.80  15.36  18.49  24.94  34.60  151%
(13.04)  (16.58)  (20.31)  (27.95)  (36.36)
Thailand  79.06  94.51  115.28  139.78  160.65  103%
(128.34) (148.71) (174.00) (203.13) (226.53)
Securities  Indonesia  45  215  198  209  249  453%
(110)  (772)  (614)  (629)  (711)
Korea  711  785  1065  1288  1547  118%
(650)  (702)  (896)  (1032)  (1276)
Malaysia  - *  1204  1385  1751  45%
- *  (1886)  (2175)  (2544)
Philippines  4.10  3.52  4.04  4.51  4.75  16%
(5.41)  (5.13)  (5.89)  (8.23)  (7.52)
Thailand  4.75  5.13  5.74  6.96  7.27  53%
(7.09)  (7.20)  (8.38)  (9.70)  (9.92)
Interest Expense  Indonesia  257  237  243  379  496  93%
(538)  (472)  (434)  (619)  (829)
Korea  473  417  521  687  798  69%
(358)  (369)  (436)  (552)  (623)
Malaysia  - *  385  441  645  68%
- *  (606)  (625)  (846)
Philippines  1.60  1.12  1.41  1.87  2.68  68%
(1.64)  (1.30)  (1.88)  (2.41)  (2.99)
Thailand  6.38  6.69  7.12  11.12  12.97  103%
(9.93)  (10.18)  (10.48)  (15.87)  (18.17)
Personnel Expense  Indonesia  27  33  40  47  56  107%
(53)  (62)  (76)  (89)  (103)
Korea  110  112  133  160  181  65%
(358)  (369)  (436)  (552)  (623)
Malaysia  - *  90  92  110  22%
- *  (122)  (130)  (151)
Philippines  0.40  0.40  0.45  0.52  0.72  80%
(0.60)  (0.65)  (0.70)  (0.83)  (1.01)
Thailand  0.84  0.96  1.16  1.37  1.50  79%
(1.35)  (1.56)  (1.89)  (2.22)  (2.34)
Operating Expense  Indonesia  10  12  20  23  21  110%
(26)  (30)  (51)  (59)  (40)
Korea  41  44  63  74  83  102%
(47)  (45)  (62)  (65)  (70)
Malaysia  - *  49  52  68  39%
- *  (68)  (68)  (93)
Philippines  0.65  0.68  0.74  0.80  1.13  74%
(0.67)  (0.75)  (0.86)  (1.01)  (1.36)
Thailand  0.99  1.13  1.37  1.69  2.06  108%
(1.49)  (1.67)  (1.99)  (2.43)  (2.84)
Source:  BankScope.  For 1992, Malaysian  data was unavailable  (-) and for 1993 only a relatively  small  number  of
Malaysian  banks was available  (*). All figures  for Indonesia  in billions  of Rupiah;  for Korea in billions  of Won; for
Malaysia  in millions  of Ringit;  for the Philippines  in billions  of Pesos;  and for  Thailand  in billions  of Baht.
28Table 4 Continued  Summary statistics for Asian banks 1992-96
Country  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  Growth (in Y)
Assets  Indonesia  2543  3016  3445  4223  5365  111%
(5598)  (6121)  (6257)  (7303)  (9011)
Korea  9193  8899  10689  12537  14939  63%
(7041)  (7562)  (8712)  (10023) (11733)
Malaysia  - *  10589  11558  14587  38%
- *  (14705) (16036) (18824)
Philippines  28.30  28.32  33.63  41.94  54.79  94%
(26.78)  (31.84)  (37.80)  (49.15)  (60.61)
Thailand  92  112  137  166  189  105%
(149)  (175)  (206)  (239)  (267)
Equity  Indonesia  148  204  249  296  376  154%
(218)  (318)  (367)  (423)  (520)
Korea  658  605  736  812  880  38%
(442)  (466)  (557)  (601)  (633)
Malaysia  - *  702  809  1067  52%
- *  (844)  (988)  (1218)
Philippines  3.30  3.29  4.31  5.37  6.98  112%
(3.08)  (3.46)  4.60)  (5.84)  (7.55)
Thailand  7  9  12  17  21  200%
(10)  (14)  (16)  (19)  (23)
Deposits  Indonesia  1609  1967  2315  2824  3650  127%
(3276)  (3776)  (3977)  (4754)  (6190)
Korea  7247  6774  8030  9250  10832  49%
(6019)  (6234)  (7117)  (8055)  (9257)
Malaysia  - *  8601  9241  11633  35%
- *  (12140) (12932)  (14893)
Philippines  20.60  20.88  24.56  29.51  37.47  82%
(20.54)  (25.06)  (29.09)  (35.46)  (42.17)
Thailand  79  93  108  129  145  84%
(134)  (154)  (175)  (202)  (224)
Loan loss provisions  Indonesia  13  7  21  28  27  108%
(38)  (11)  (76)  (85)  (52)
Korea  37  39  89  67  66  78%
(43)  (52)  (114)  (74)  (74)
Malaysia  - *  41  42  62  151%
- *  (990)  (67)  (93)
Philippines  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.16  0.23  130%
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.24)  (0.43)
Thailand  0.53  0.49  0.60  0.56  1.40  164%
(1.07)  (1.10)  (1.06)  (0.97)  (4.14)
Short-term borrowings  Indonesia  207  264  377  635  802  287%
(305)  (417)  (679)  (1076)  (1582)
Korea  3717  3307  4101  4806  5600  51%
(3879)  (3832)  (4288)  (4781)  (5232)
Malaysia  - *  2212  2441  3257  47%
- *  (3545)  (3760)  (4953)
Philippines  0.82  0.93  0.84  1.00  1.02  24%
(1.29)  (1.53)  (1.94)  (1,82)  (1.21)
Thailand  12  12  16  19  19  58%
(26)  (25)  (25)  (28)  (33)
Source:  BankScope.  For 1992, Malaysian  data was unavailable  (-) and for 1993  only a relatively  small  number  of
Malaysian  banks was available  (*). All figures  for Indonesia  in billions  of Rupiah;  for Korea in billions  of Won; for
Malaysia  in millions  of Ringit;  for  the Philippines  in billions  of Pesos;  and for Thailand in billions of Baht.
29Table 5  Average technical  efficiency  scores in % (standard deviations  between brackets)
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1992-96
Indonesia  48 (24)  59 (22)  70 (19)  63 (18)  66 (21)  61 (22)
Korea  89 (11)  94 (7)  92 (9)  84 (10)  87 (12)  89 (10)
Malaysia  - 73 (28)  73 (25) 68 (21) 70 (21) 70 (22)
Philippines  56 (20) 61 (24) 65 (25) 77 (26) 79 (23) 68 (25)
Thailand  68 (21) 77 (18)  83 (19)  78 (18)  83 (17) 78 (19)
Table 6  Average risk-taking by ownership form in % for the period 1992-96
(standard errors between brackets)
Ownership  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand
State-owned  6 (109)  7 (15)  11 (37)  25 (0)  24 (16)
Family  235 (250)  - -9 (0)  134 (84)  14 (20)
Company  169 (203)  -20 (76)  24 (48)  145 (150)  -
Widely  -17 (103)  -13 (40)  47 (16)**  15 (278)  29 (32)
Foreign  82 (123)  -4 (0)  -41 (65)  201 (140)  80 (76)
All banks  143 (204)  -11 (45)  3 (59)  134 (151)  49 (62)
**  Significantly  different  from average  at 5% level
Table 7  Average  risk-taking  across not-restructured  and  restructured  banks during  1992-96
(standard  errors  between brackets)
Not-Restructured Banks  Restructured Banks
Risk-taking  Number of banks  Risk-taking  Number of banks
Indonesia  0.79 (1.12)  22  1.97 (2.43)  32
Korea  -0.43 (0.53)  6  -0.01 (0.38)  19
Malaysia  -0.04 (0.72)  22  0.15 (0.21)  12
Philippines  1.18 (1.57)  21  1.78 (1.20)  8
Thailand  0.00 (0.00)  1  0.22 (0.23)  14
30Regression 1  Two-factor fixed effects model for the region of changes in efficiency
Dependent variable:  AMy  (xfig, yftg )
Model size:  565 Observations  (panel data)
Adjusted R-squared:  0.28801
Model test:  F[16, 5481 =  15.26;  Prob value =0.00000**
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.e. P/7TIŽtoos]
Constant  -0.04298  0.03047  -1.411  0.15835
ALOANS  0.35662  0.03069  11.620  0.00000**
ACAR  -0.02459  0.02215  -1.110  0.26696
APROVRT  -0.69814E-06  0.22817E-05  -0.306  0.75963
ASHORT  -0.79680E-04  0.56249E-04  -1.417  0.15661
STATE  0.01390  0.04397  0.316  0.75186
FAMILY  0.03707  0.03979  0.932  0.35152
COMPANY  0.02053  0.03672  0.559  0.57614
FOREIGN  0.03884  0.03785  1.026  0.30487
Country  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.  e. No. of Obs.
Indonesia  0.02100  0.01633  1.29  186
Korea  -0.04516  0.02963  -1.54  94
Malaysia  -0.08828  0.02998  -2.94  69**
Philippines  0.06228  0.02377  2.62  100**
Thailand  0.00174  0.02326  0.07  116
Year  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.  e. No. of Obs.
1992-93  0.13292  0.02088  6.37  119**
1993-94  0.00282  0.01785  0.16  153
1994-95  -0.09089  0.01705  -5.33  161**
1995-96  -0.01224  0.01959  0.62  132
**  Significant  at 5% level; * Significant  at 10%  level
Regression 2.a  OLS regression model for region of risk-taking measure
Dependent variable:  R  fg y
Model size:  141 Observations  (panel data)
Adjusted R-squared:  0.23366
Model test:  F[7, 133] =7.10;  Prob value =  0.00000**
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.e. P  712tŽ05]
Constant  0.36924  0.30163  1.224  0.22305
ASSETS 92 -3.1769  2.0454  -1.553  0.12276
A92-96PROV  0.0040678  0.004827  0.843  0.40090
A92-96SHORT  0.0017194  0.000339  5.070  0.00000**
STATE  -0.032229  0.45315  -0.071  0.94341
FAMILY  1.1661  0.36975  3.154  0.00199**
COMPANY  0.56149  0.34280  1.638  0.10379*
FOREIGN  0.053983  0.36196  0.149  0.88167
** Significant  at 5% level;  * Significant  at 10*  level
31Regression 2.b  One-factor fixed effects model for region of risk-taking measure
Dependent variable:  R fg y
Model size:  141 Observations  (panel data)
Adjusted R-squared:  0.31345
Model test:  F[l 1,  129] =6.81;  Prob value =0.00000**
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.  e. P] 712tooso]
ASSETS 92 -2.3755  2.0182  -1.177  0.24128
A92-96PROV  0.005117  0.004615  1.109  0.26950
A92-96SHORT  0.001589  0.000325  4.887  0.00000**
STATE  -0.20144  0.43816  -0.460  0.64645
FAMILY  0.63515  0.41041  1.548  0.12408
COMPANY  0.23818  0.38163  0.624  0.53361
FOREIGN  -0.20694  0.40414  -0.512  0.60945
Country  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.  e. No. of Obs.
Indonesia  1.01568  0.38831  2.62  45**
Korea  0.02488  0.32722  0.08  19
Malaysia  0.07737  0.43251  0.18  29
Philippines  1.35716  0.44377  3.06  19**
Thailand  0.44645  0.40082  1.11  29
**  Significant  at 5% level;  * Significant  at 10*  level
Regression 3  Binomial logit model for region of restructuring incl. risk measure
Dependent variable:  RESTRUCT (=1 if bank has been restructured; =0 if no restructuring)
Model size:  156 Observations  (panel data)
Model test:  Chi2 with 10 degrees of freedom = 61.80;  Prob value =0.00000**
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.  e. Pfi 712toos]
R fg  0.59642  0.22749  2.622  0.00875** y
ASSETS 92 10.523  5.8226  1.807  0.07073*
STATE  1.1917  0.98071  1.215  0.22431
FAMILY  1.7047  0.87935  1.939  0.05255**
COMPANY  1.2494  0.76474  1.634  0.10230*
FOREIGN  -0.21142  0.87311  -0.242  0.80867
Indonesia  -1.4231  0.81501  -1.746  0.08079*
Korea  0.52276  0.55837  0.936  0.34916
Malaysia  -1.8046  0.82411  -2.190  0.02854**
Philippines  -3.5053  0.97421  -3.598  0.00032**
Thailand  0.94273  1.1707  0.805  0.42066
** Significant  at 5% level; * Significant  at 10*  level
Regression 3  Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted
Actual  No restructuring  Restructuring  Total
No restructuring  52  20  72
Restructuring  18  66  84
Total  70  86  156
32Regression 4  Binomial logit model for region of restructuring incl. loan growth
Dependent variable:  RESTRUCT (=1 if bank has been restructured; =0 if no restructuring)
Model size:  156 Observations  (panel data)
Model test:  Chi 2 with 10 degrees of freedom = 52.68;  Prob value  0.00000**
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  T=b/s.  e. PL 71->o.o]5
Loan growth  -0.24596  0.58535  -0.420  0.67434
ASSETS 92 8.2611  5.7902  1.427  0.15365
STATE  1.0364  0.93492  1.109  0.26764
FAMILY  2.0139  0.85657  2.351  0.01872**
COMPANY  1.4954  0.76351  1.959  0.05016*
FOREIGN  -0.20815  0.85488  -0.243  0.80763
Indonesia  -0.77037  0.79934  -0.964  0.33517
Korea  0.53513  0.57689  0.928  0.35361
Malaysia  -1.7038  0.85885  -1.984  0.04728**
Philippines  -2.5818  0.94310  -2.738  0.00619**
Thailand  1.2236  1.1716  1.044  0.29632
**  Significant  at 5% level;  * Significant  at 10*  level
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